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Privatization by State 
and Market 
Wendy Carlin and Colin Mayer 
To date, most of Eastern Europe has pursued privatization through markets: 
auctions, vouchers, mutual funds, and stock market flotations have all been 
widely advocated. The state has been viewed as an impediment whose involve- 
ment in the enterprise sector needs to be terminated at the earliest opportunity. 
There is one exception. Despite having an unusual abundance of managerial 
and financial resources,  responsibility  for restructuring  East German enter- 
prises has fallen on a state agency, the Treuhandanstalt (THA). This paper is 
an exploration of the way in which the THA has undertaken its function and 
of the lessons, if any, that it provides for the rest of Eastern Europe. We are not 
concerned here with the process of German unification and the course of events 
that rendered the vast majority of East German industry unprofitable (see, for 
example, Akerlof et al. 1991; Sinn and Sinn 1991; Dornbusch and Wolf, chap. 
5 in vol. 1). This paper focuses on how the THA has engaged in restructuring 
and privatization in a situation in which the majority of  tradable-sector jobs 
were under immediate threat. 
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Section 14.1 describes the principles and methods by which the THA oper- 
ates. These include extensive restructuring of enterprises prior to privatization, 
identification and evaluation of potential purchasers, and imposition and moni- 
toring of conditions relating to sales of enterprises. 
Section 14.2 describes the THA in operation. It discusses a case of a restmc- 
turing and privatization of a heavy industry Kombinat in Leipzig. This provides 
valuable insight into the significance that the THA attaches to considerations 
other than sale price, the procedure by which the THA evaluates social as well 
as private benefits, asset disposals, the formation of management and supervi- 
sory boards, and the interaction of the THA with Western  firms, banks, and 
regional governments. 
Section 14.3 turns to the central question: Why is the involvement of the 
state not just an unwarranted  interference with market processes? The THA 
offers some clues. It is clear that considerations other than sale price have been 
crucial in privatizations: foremost among these are employment and regional/ 
industrial policy. The attainment of  these objectives has required nonmarket 
forms of restructuring. This can be seen by  contrasting  the operation of the 
THA with three market alternatives: simple auctions of enterprises, auctions 
with employment  subsidies, and conditional  auctions with employment  and 
investment requirements  attached. The interaction between employment and 
investment requirements in attaining the objectives of privatization is an im- 
portant limitation on market processes. 
Market transactions are limited in other ways. Allocating control of an enter- 
prise  through  sales  involves  competition  for  ownership  by  purchasers  of 
shares. This ensures appropriate patterns of ownership and control only where 
all potential purchasers have access to capital on equal terms. This is clearly 
not the case in Eastern Europe: domestic credit is severely constrained in rela- 
tion to that available to overseas purchasers. It is therefore far from evident 
that market sales allocate ownership and control appropriately. 
In addition  to the attainment  of the social objectives of  employment  and 
regional policy, there is a second basic issue: How can distortions created by 
credit constraints be avoided? East Germany offers only limited guidance on 
this. Even in the country that is commonly associated with the most industri- 
ally oriented banking system in the world, there is little evidence of financial 
support for East German  enterprises. To date, the distinctive feature of East 
Germany is that enterprise control has not been retained within East Germany; 
privatizations have virtually exclusively  involved transfers of ownership and 
control to Western enterprises. However, there is evidence that this may be on 
the point of changing, and East Germany provides important insights into how 
the process of privatization  can be associated with debt financing and hence 
the retention of local ownership and control. 
To many, the experience of  East Germany will appear to be of only limited 
relevance to other countries. The abundance of managerial  expertise and fi- 
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East European countries. On the other side of the coin, monetary union created 
problems that were specific to Germany. East Germany is therefore regarded 
as a case of its own. 
Section 14.4 argues that this judgment is too quick. The resources and prob- 
lems may be different, but the objectives and requirements for their successful 
attainment are similar. East Germany illustrates the pitfalls of restructuring and 
privatization and the process by which they can be contained. This involves a 
gradual transfer of control from central agency to private enterprise. The paper 
concludes that retention of domestic control does not require an initial abun- 
dance of domestic managerial resources. 
14.1  The Treuhand’s Method of Privatization 
14.1.1  Supervisory Boards 
The creation of  the Treuhandanstalt predates economic union between East 
and  West  Germany.  Ownership  of  all  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  was 
transferred to the trust  agency in March  1990. SOEs with more than  2,000 
employees were converted into AGs (German public stock corporations) and 
smaller SOEs into limited-liability companies (GmbHs). When the West Ger- 
mans took over and reorganized the Treuhand, they were the owners of some 
8,000 enterprises with a total employment of about 4 million (Kiihl 1991,682). 
They assigned smaller enterprises (with fewer than  1,500 employees) to re- 
gional subsidiaries of the THA and the larger enterprises to the industry-based 
divisions of the THA in Berlin. We  do not discuss the privatization  of  very 
small businesses such as shops, kiosks, and pharmacies. 
The Treuhand is a public agency with a supervisory board (the Verwultungs- 
rut) in which important interest groups in Germany are represented: the federal 
government (economics and finance ministries), state (Lander) governments, 
the Bundesbank, the commercial banks, major West German firms, the trade 
unions, and, to signify the importance of  non-Germans in privatizations,  two 
European businessmen. 
One of the THA’s first tasks was to ensure that all its enterprises with more 
than 500 employees had a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrut).  These boards have 
a similar composition to the Verwultungsrut: there are “shareholder” represen- 
tatives from local government, banks, and other companies. “Employee” repre- 
sentation is established by law at one-third of the supervisory board for firms 
with fewer than  1,500 employees and half for larger firms. Chairpersons of 
supervisory boards are drawn from among the shareholders’ representatives on 
the board and have casting votes in the event of a tie between shareholder and 
employee representatives. 
Table 14.1 records the source of supervisory board members and chairper- 
sons in East German firms. A large majority of both representatives and chair- 
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Table 14.1  The Origin of “Shareholder” Representatives and Chairpersons of 
Supervisory Boards of East German Enterprises 
Supervisory Board  Supervisory Board 
Members (%)  Chairpersons (’3%) 
Other companies (mostly West German)  60-70 
Banks (West German)  20-25 
Local government  10-15 
80 
20 
Source: Data supplied by  the THA, September 1991. 
banks account for one-fifth of both  seats on boards and chairpersons. Local 
governments have some representation on boards but do not hold any chairper- 
son positions. 
Supervisory boards oversee the formulation and implementation of restruc- 
turing plans. They discuss proposals with senior management of East German 
enterprises, suggest modifications, and monitor their implementation. They are 
a source of management expertise providing East German managers with ad- 
vice and assistance. They have the power to dismiss management where neces- 
sary and are instrumental in bringing in new management. Supervisory boards 
assist East German firms in making contacts with Western (usually West Ger- 
man) firms and help create markets for East German products. 
Table 14.2  reports that most new managers come on consultancies and short- 
term contracts from West German firms. Between one-fifth and one-quarter 
are active managers of  West German firms, and between one-twentieth and 
one-tenth are retired managers. 
14.1.2 
All THA enterprises were required to submit an opening balance sheet in 
deutsche marks and a business plan to the Treuhand. The original intention of 
the THA had been to establish independently audited balance sheets for its 
enterprises and to offer enterprises for sale, providing potential buyers with 
this balance sheet and the business plan. A key problem emerged quickly and 
led to a change in strategy: in the absence of a market for real estate in East 
Germany, the book value of enterprise property was too low, with the result 
that property developers tried to purchase enterprises purely for the expected 
capital gain on land. 
The valuation problem revealed a deeper concern in the Treuhand with “un- 
conditional” sales of firms: the THA was interested not simply in securing the 
highest price for the enterprise but in transferring ownership to a purchaser 
who would continue to operate the business. 
The THA carried out an evaluation of the potential viability of  each of  its 
enterprises in a market economy. It set up a team of eighty top West German 
managers (Leitungsausschuj)  to evaluate opening balance sheets and restruc- 
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Table 14.2  New Managing Directors of Treuhand Firms from West Germany 
Consultants and managers on short-term contracts (%) 
Active managers (%)  20-25 
70 
Retired managers (%)  5-1 0 
~~ 
Source: Data supplied by the THA, September 1991. 
Note: Of 8,786 THA firms surveyed in 199  I,  there were 23,673 Eastern and 2,63  I  Western manag- 
ers in the “most senior” management positions (reported by Mayhew and Seabright 1992, 118). 
turing plans of each of  its enterprises and to indicate how profitability could 
be achieved over the next two to three years. Restructuring plans included re- 
quired reductions in employment and changes in products and processes. 
The Treuhand team made a judgment as to whether an enterprise could be 
restructured successfully and assigned the enterprise to one of six categories 
(Carlin and Mayer 1992, 329). Enterprises assigned to categories 5 and 6 were 
judged  not to be capable of  successful restructuring  and were destined for 
closure. 
Balance sheets had to be adjusted to ensure that the 70 percent of enterprises 
categorized as “potentially viable” had a chance of survival. In particular, lia- 
bilities incurred by the enterprises to the state bank under the central planning 
system had to be written off. The method adopted by the THA was to compare 
projected  turnover, assets,  and  liabilities  of  East  German enterprises with 
equivalent firms in West Germany. The capital structure of these West German 
firms was used as a yardstick for the THA enterprises. Old debts were written 
down so as to create a “confirmed” balance sheet (the so-called festgestellte 
Bilunz), which gave the THA firm a fair chance of  survival for two to three 
years (for a worked example, see Informationen,  no. 5:s-9  [THA  1991al). 
THA officials estimate that about three-quarters of the DM 106 billion in old 
debts will be written off through this procedure. 
14.1.3  The Terms of Sales: Price, Employment, and Investment Guarantees 
Contracts for sales include guarantees by purchasers of minimum levels of 
employment and investment in an enterprise as well as a sale price. Penalty 
clauses are written into contracts that specify the THA’s share of capital gains 
in enterprises sold within five years of their privatization and payments due to 
the THA if the investment and employment guarantees are not fulfilled. 
Negotiations over sales prices involve discussions about employment and 
investment guarantees; discounts on sales prices are made on a per job and per 
deutsche mark of investment guaranteed basis. From discussions with Treu- 
hand officials, it appears that the reduction in the sales price per job guaranteed 
has increased over time from DM 12,000-15,000 to up to DM 50,000 in recent 
deals. This is consistent with data showing sales revenue received by the THA 
per job guaranteed declining from DM 23,100 to DM 16,600 from the first to 
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guaranteed have risen from DM 75,100 to DM 115,000. This is consistent with 
a trend toward jobs being made more secure (data supplied by THA officials, 
1991). 
The imposition of employment targets reflects the obligation placed on the 
THA by the government to take account of the social costs of unemployment. 
For example, the THA takes DM 300,000 per job as the opportunity cost of 
permanent unemployment for large chemical enterprises, and it incorporates 
this into comparisons of the costs and value of liquidations and privatizations 
(McKinsey & Co. 199  I, 2-7). 
The THA official in charge of the sale of  a particular  enterprise takes the 
restructuring plan  of  the firm drawn up by  the  incumbent management and 
the supervisory board and forms a view (often with the assistance of outside 
management consultants) of the maximum number of jobs that can be saved. 
Buyers for the enterprise are sought by the management and the THA. Employ- 
ment targets are paramount, and enterprises can be sold for an effective nega- 
tive price. This is achieved by combining a sale price of DM 1.00 with invest- 
ment grants to purchasers.  (The number of  DM 1.00 sales has declined since 
balance sheets have been adjusted and debt written off.) In exchange, the pur- 
chaser makes investment and employment guarantees. 
The submission to the management board of the THA (the Vorstandsvor- 
luge) sets out the terms of the proposed disposal of the enterprise and the busi- 
ness plan of the purchaser. 
14.1.4  Restructuring Prior to Privatization 
East German enterprises faced intense competition in their domestic market 
immediately after German economic and monetary union on 1 July 1990. On 
the basis of an analysis of  input-output data, Akerlof et al. (1991) estimated 
the expense  in ostmark of  major East German  enterprises (the Kornbinate) 
earning a deutsche mark in Western markets. They found that less than  10 
percent of employment in these enterprises was viable in covering even short- 
run variable costs. 
This cost problem was exacerbated by the collapse of the CMEA (Council 
for Mutual  Economic Assistance) and the Soviet Union as a purchaser. It is 
estimated that between 900,000 and  1 million industrial jobs were dependent 
on sales to former command economies (FCEs), with more than half going to 
the Soviet Union (DZW Wochenbericht, no. 12 [ 19911:  127). Fourteen percent 
of East German industrial output was sold to FCEs. The much faster than ex- 
pected loss of markets to the East underlined the importance of restructuring. 
The huge East German Kombinate were typically organized along product 
lines with plants scattered across East Germany. Incumbent managers saw the 
supply of  output to the Soviet Union as providing  the rationale for keeping 
Kombinate (comprising up to twenty enterprises) together as a unit. Synergies 
within  Kombinate were regarded  by  managers  as the  source of  their enter- 
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To avoid widescale collapse through bankruptcy, the THA initially provided 
100 percent guarantees for liquidity credits to all enterprises. Guaranteed loans 
were granted across the board without any evaluation of the risk of default. 
The amount of  loans guaranteed was expected to cover 40 percent of forecast 
losses in the enterprise sector. Enterprise managers perceived a relatively hard 
budget constraint and responded  by  cutting employment. Table  14.3 records 
reductions in employment in THA-owned enterprises to the end of 1991. Total 
employment  in THA-owned firms has declined by 65 percent,  of which 23 
percent  is attributed to employment guarantees in firms that have been sold 
(i.e., jobs that have been saved) and 42 percent to job shedding and closures. 
Since the completion of the evaluation of potential viability at the end of 1991, 
the THA has stopped all guaranteed loans to enterprises in categories 5 and 6; 
enterprises in these categories are now required to secure bank loans without 
THA guarantees. 
The loss of Soviet markets encouraged the Treuhand to break up Kombinate 
into legally separate enterprises; the view was that buyers for the huge indus- 
trial holding companies could not be found. By the autumn of 1991, plans were 
in place for reducing the number of holding companies by one-third and the 
number of subsidiaries of holding companies by two-thirds (THA 1991~). 
Despite  its motto-"Privatization  as  the  best  form of  restructuring"-the 
THA has been actively involved in restructuring. It has become increasingly 
evident that large industrial conglomerates must be broken up if viable firms 
are to emerge. Management and, in some cases, supervisory boards have fre- 
quently obstructed the breaking up of the old structures. As owner of the enter- 
prises, the THA can dismiss the  supervisory board.  In addition,  a new  law 
was introduced in 1991 to enable the THA to separate subsidiaries of holding 
Table 14.3  Reduction in Employment in THA-Owned Firms (thousands) 
Of Which, 
Accounted for by 
Employment  Accounted for by 
Employment in  Fall in  Guarantees in  Labor Shedding 
THA Firms  Employment  THA Finns Sold  and Closures.' 
1 July 1990  4.000 
I January 1991  2,979  1,02  1  20 1  820 
1 July 1991  2,310  669  338  33 I 
I January 1992  1,404  906  391  515 
Forecast 
Total  2,596  930  1,666 
Source: Calculated from Kuhl (1992) and data supplied by the THA. 
+This is an  approximation obtained by  subtracting jobs guaranteed from the total reduction in 
employment in THA firms. Note that, in  some contracts, the number of jobs guaranteed rises 
over time. 196  Wendy Carlin and Colin Mayer 
companies from the parent enterprise and to enable subsidiaries to take the 
initiative for separation from the parent (Heimpold, Kroll, and Wilhelm 1991, 
The Treuhand had decided on the closure of over 700 enterprises even before 
the completion of the classification exercise described above. More than four- 
fifths of closures are being carried out using a form of liquidation that places 
priority on salvaging viable parts of the enterprise rather than on meeting the 
claims of creditors (Carlin and Mayer 1992, 329-30).  The liquidation team is 
maximizing the number of jobs saved or created on the  sites of  enterprises 
being closed. 
14.1.5  The Privatization Record 
36-40). 
In the year and a half since the West Germans took control of the THA, they 
have  succeeded  in  disposing  entirely  of  over  one-third of  their  enterprises 
(table 14.4). Over one-quarter of these have been closed or wound up. The total 
number of  enterprises that are or were owned by the THA has grown since 
Union by virtue of the splitting up of firms discussed above. Nearly one-quarter 
of  THA firms have been  sold  to the  private  sector-nearly  one-quarter  of 
which have been sold to East Germans as MBOs (management buyouts). As 
table 14.4 indicates, the role of foreign buyers has been very limited. 
Table 14.4  Sales and Disposals of Enterprises by the Treuhandenstalt 
Status of Treuhand Firms as of 
the End of  I99  1 
% of Total 
THA 
Number  Enterprises 
Firms disposed of in their entirety’ 
Of which, sold as MBOsb 
Of which, sold to foreigners 
Reprivatized (returned to previous owners) 
Transferred to local authorities 
Being closed 
Other (wound up through closure, merger, 
Sold to the private sector 
or splitting up) 
Enterprises still to be disposed of‘ 
Majority owned by private sector 




















58.  I 
5.6 
52.0 
Total enterprises that are or were owned by 
the THAd  10,970  100.0 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by the THA. 
’Includes enterprises for which transactions have been decided but which may be incomplete. 
hA further 248 parts of enterprises have been sold as MBOs. 
‘Note that the Treuhand announces as its “headline” figure for privatizations the total of all firms 
for which it has sold at least a part. By the end of 1991, this number was 5,210. 
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Table 14.5 indicates that the distribution of privatizations  by  size of enter- 
prise has been very even. As would be expected, MBOs are concentrated in 
smaller enterprises. 
14.2  From Kombinat to Private Firm: The Case of Baukema Kombinat 
The active involvement of the THA in privatization is illustrated by the case 
of a former Kombinat. This case is used to highlight the creation and activities 
of the supervisory board; the role of management, supervisory board, and the 
THA in developing a restructuring plan and identifying and evaluating poten- 
tial buyers; the splitting up of large enterprises by the THA; the social cost/ 
benefit analysis conducted by the THA and the negotiation of sale price, em- 
ployment, and investment guarantees; and the behavior of incumbent manage- 
ment under THA ownership. 
14.2.1  Background 
The Baukema Kombinat was created only in 1987, in what turned out to be 
the last wave of industrial reorganization in East Germany. It was formed from 
two distinct groups of enterprises: first, the original Baukema Kombinat, which 
was a Leipzig-based holding company with its origins in construction machin- 
ery, and, second, the Gisag Kombinat, which at the time was an East Germany- 
wide foundry enterprise with 33,000 employees and its headquarters on the 
outskirts of Leipzig. Baukema Kombinat took over the core of Gisag (employ- 
ment of 6,000), located in the Leipzig area. 
An early decision of the Treuhand supported by the Baukema board was to 
separate out the foundries from the rest of  Baukema’s activities. The grouping 
together of foundries with construction equipment had no industrial logic, and 
the organizational structure of Gisag and Baukema had remained fairly sepa- 
rate. In the case study, attention is focused on the foundry side of the business, 
that is, on Gisag. 
Table 14.5  The Size Distribution of Privatizations and MBOs (data as of the end 
of October 1991) 
% of  Enterprises  That 
















Source:  Carlin and Mayer (1992, table 5, 332). 198  Wendy Carlin and Colin Mayer 
14.2.2  The Future of the Foundry Industry and of Gisag 
The formal separation of the foundries, centered around the large Gisag AG 
enterprise, from Baukema AG and their direct attachment to the THA occurred 
in September 1991-six  months after active THA engagement with Baukema 
began.  As soon as Gisag became  an AG in  May  1990 (before  Union),  the 
management sought the advice of  the West German foundry association  and 
of the Dresdner Bank (Gisag’s Hausbank) regarding suitable candidates for the 
supervisory board. The president of  the West German Foundry  Association, 
Eberhard  Mollmann,  accepted  the  chairman’s position  on  the  supervisory 
board. 
From the outset, the restructuring of  Gisag was viewed within the context 
of the future of the entire foundry industry in East Germany. The starting point 
for the East German foundry industry was the requirement that it compete with 
West German suppliers. The structural change undergone by the West German 
industry since the  1950s was taken  as indicative  of  the required changes in 
East Germany and in  Gisag itself. Fundamental change was required  in the 
scale and composition of foundry output and in  the  size of  enterprises. For 
example,  in  a  speech  at  Gisag,  Mollman  pointed  out  that  the  number  of 
foundry firms in West Germany had fallen by 60 percent between  1960 and 
1990, with  no increase in the  average size of  the  remaining plants. Three- 
quarters of  all West German  foundries have fewer than  200 employees.  In 
terms of Gisag, for example, the extrusion foundry had sufficient capacity to 
supply the entire German market. In  199  1, 300,000 tons of output were pro- 
duced by the East German industry using only 25 percent of available capacity. 
In Mollmann’s view, output from East German foundries could rise to 400,000 
tons by the end of the decade. 
One of the Gisag foundries cast the components for the tracks of all Warsaw 
Pact  tanks. This order was canceled, and the  steel foundry  employing  800 
workers was closed down completely in the first quarter of  199  1. Orders to the 
other foundries had collapsed with the drop in manufacturing output in East 
Germany. For example, one of  the foundries made crankshafts for Trabants. 
Production of these cars ceased in May 1991. The finance director stressed the 
problems with securing orders in current conditions in which the future of the 
enterprise was uncertain. Customers felt that they had no security of supply. 
14.2.3  Management under THA Ownership 
Management remained unchanged from pre-Union days, with the exception 
of the appointment of a personnel manager (from West Germany). From May 
1990, the managers spent a considerable amount of time undergoing training. 
The finance director spent time in Hanover with Salzgitter AG and in Augs- 
burg with Preussag shadowing managers. He learned profit and loss account- 
ing, how to calculate costs and utilize investment  planning techniques. The 
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was the increased relative dominance of the finance side as compared with the 
traditional emphasis on technical/production management. 
14.2.4  The Strategy to Sell Gisag 
The board of Gisag decided to appoint an expert on the casting industry in 
Europe (an American, found through the West German casting federation) to 
assist with finding buyers for Gisag or parts of it. Originally, the managers had 
taken  the view that Gisag should be kept together and should offer the full 
product palette (steel, iron, shell mold, etc.). At the end of  1990, the philoso- 
phy changed as the size of the problem became more evident. Gisag manage- 
ment came round to the idea that the only way  of  saving any of the foundry 
business was to split it up. This was partly  influenced  by  the U.S.  industry 
expert and by the supervisory board chairman, Mollmann. 
The Treuhand  official assigned to the  BaukemdGisag case was a highly 
experienced West German manager who had been brought in to the Treuhand 
through the German chancellor’s initiative. He engaged a management consul- 
tancy to carry out an assessment of Baukema and Gisag. The THA encouraged 
the use by  Gisag AG of the industry  expert in particular  to try to persuade 
companies with foundries in West Germany to move with their markets to the 
East. This reflected recognition of  the central problem facing Gisag: how to 
find a market for its products. 
14.2.5  Restructuring and Privatization 
By September 1991, two alternative strategies for the Gisag enterprise had 
been identified by the Treuhand. The choice was to break up the enterprise and 
sell off the foundries individually or to close the enterprise. The THA made 
calculations of the cost to them of each of these proposals. 
Option 1:  Closure. It would cost DM 180 million to close Gisag AG down 
and sell the assets at liquidation value. No permanent jobs would be saved. The 
costs of closure include only the direct costs to the enterprise-for  example, 
the Sozialplan (cost of redundancies =  DM 2,000-5,000  per employee)-and 
not the costs to the economy as a whole (e.g., unemployment benefits). 
Option 2: Privatization.  It  would  cost  DM 208  million  to privatize  the 
foundries successfully. Successful privatization in this case entails two foundry 
firms in West Germany (operating in inner-city sites in Frankfurt and Ingol- 
stadt) relocating to the main Gisag site in Leipzig and bringing their orders 
with them. A Swedish firm is interested in buying  the most modem of  the 
foundries (which was built before reunification to supply Volkswagen’s engine 
plant).  Another  could  be  sold  to  a  consortium  of  distributors  (from  Italy, 
France, and the United Kingdom) that wanted to establish some production 
capability. Although the most modern foundry is expected to attract a positive 
price,  the price will  be low reflecting  the  excess capacity  in  the European 
foundry business. The other foundries could not be sold at a positive price, and 
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whole. The Treuhand would pay grants to the purchasers of foundries, includ- 
ing reimbursement for their anticipated losses, amounting to DM 37 million. 
The foundries would be sold for DM  1  .OO. 
Under option 2, purchasers would make investment guarantees of  DM 77 
million. They would guarantee 980 jobs (out of  a current 3,600) as against 
none under option 1. Thus, 980 jobs would be saved at an additional cost of 
DM 28 million (i.e., a cost per job of DM 28,000). 
The management board of the THA had to decide if this was worthwhile. If 
the THA were simply a private holding company, then it would adopt option 1 
without question. One of the relevant considerations was the external effect of 
the existence of a foundry industry in Leipzig under option 2. Part of the addi- 
tional costs required to make privatization possible (i.e., of the cost of option 
2) is the outlay required to prepare the site for the operation of the privatized 
foundries. With one exception, the existing foundries will be demolished and 
new facilities installed. The buyers get the site for nothing, and their start-up 
losses are covered. The companies will invest DM 77 million themselves in 
new facilities. A large part of the investment guaranteed by one of the purchas- 
ers would take the form of orders for an independent THA company that makes 
foundry plants. 
In view of the positive external effects of retaining the foundry business and 
the social costs of increased unemployment, the THA asked the city of Leipzig 
and the Land of Sachsen to contribute to the cost of implementing option 2. A 
contribution of  DM 30 million was sought. To date, DM 10 million has been 
committed by Leipzig. 
The THA adopted option 2 in November  1991. This empties Gisag AG of 
content-it  is  simply  a  shell owning  ancillary  property,  such  as  nineteen 
blocks of flats, a hotel, etc. It will be put into liquidation and the assets sold. 
Additional  buyers are being sought for the remaining bits and pieces. Small 
MBOs on the main Gisag site have been encouraged. To September 1991, five 
small MBOs had occurred, resulting in employment of 250. A railway siding 
and line linking the outer Leipzig site to the Leipzig main railway station was 
sold for DM 100,000; a West German partner was involved in this MBO. 
Key features of the sales contract between the THA and one of the purchas- 
ers of a Gisag foundry are shown in table 14.6. Of note is the inclusion in the 
contract of detail concerning the purchaser’s existing business and the future 
business at Gisag. 
15.2.6  The Treuhand’s Role in the Restructuring 
The role of the Treuhandanstalt in restructuring the former Kombinat can be 
summarized as follows: 
Spinning off the foundries from Baukema AG (this has involved the Treu- 
hand taking over the losses of the foundries directly and undertaking closer 
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Table 14.6  Elements of the Sales Contract for a Gisag Foundry 
The purchaser opcrates a foundry in x [in West Germany] with approximately 600 employees 
and has particular knowledge and experience and an important market share in the casting 
industry. 
The purchaser will continue to operate the foundry [at Gisag] . . . and on the same location after 
the renewal of the area . . . by the seller [THAI will erect a y-foundry with modern competitive 
technology with a capacity of z tons and providing a level of 200 rising to 600 permanent full- 
time jobs, investing a total of DM 40 million. 
If the purchaser sells or transfers the land . . . to a third party before the 3  I  December 1993, then 
the purchaser must transfer 80 percent of the proceeds to the THA. 
The purchaser will continue the business of v-casting and expand it in the following way: the 
purchaser will by the end of  1993 have invested at least DM 20 million in the y-foundry, in 
particular for the procurement and installation of a new large molding plant, and by the end of 
1995 a further DM 20 million. 
If by the end of  1993 there are not binding orders for the investment of DM 20 million, then the 
purchaser must pay the THA the difference between the value of such orders and the DM 20 
million. . . .  The purchaser will provide quarterly reports to the THA on the actual and planned 
investment. 
The purchaser is obliged to provide at least the following number of full-time jobs and to report 
employment at the end of each quarter. . . . If this obligation is not met, then for each missing job 
the purchaser must pay the THA for the period of the missing employment per month a penalty 
of DM 2,000 . . . [up to] DM 2,500. . . . 
The penalties do not apply only when the nonemployment of workers comes about through force 
majeure or through the failure of the THA to provide the essential services. 
Source: THA 
Restructuring Gisag AG by  separating out the foundry activities  from the 
Evaluating the costs of closure (option 1); 
In  conjunction  with  management,  identifying  buyers  for  the  individual 
foundries (option 2); 
Securing the retention of foundries in Leipzig (this involved separate negoti- 
ation with potential purchasers for each foundry); 
Seeking to persuade Bund, findel; and local government to contribute to the 
costs of  pursuing option 2  (the higher-cost option to the Treuhand) on the 
grounds that its social cost is lower once account is taken of the employment, 
regional, and industrial implications; 
other Gisag enterprises (e.g., foundry plant construction); 
Winding up the remaining activities of Gisag through a liquidation team. 
14.3  State versus Market Systems of Restructuring 
The distinguishing characteristic of East German privatizations is the close 
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prior to privatization. The German government has not sought to privatize en- 
terprises at the earliest opportunity;  instead, considerable emphasis has been 
placed on two considerations, employment and industrialhegional policy. The 
THA's  guidelines for the privatization of  enterprises state that account should 
be taken of the following: the continued operation and modernization of the 
business by  the purchaser;  securing employment;  effects on  the viability  of 
suppliers from East Germany; contribution  to the economic strength of  the 
area around the enterprise; the future contribution to tax income (THA 1991b). 
The Gisag case illustrates these concerns quite clearly. By delegating control 
to an agency whose objectives include broader social criteria, the German gov- 
ernment was redressing the balance between its interests as owner and its func- 
tion  as guardian  of  the East German  productive  sector. Inevitably, conflicts 
arise between these objectives, and these have been reflected in disputes be- 
tween the Finance Ministry and the Economics Ministry over policies pursued 
by the Treuhandanstalt. 
An impediment to privatization comes from emphasizing these broader con- 
siderations. Were it the case that the THA merely  wished  to maximize  the 
proceeds  from sales or dispose of  assets at the earliest  opportunity,  then  it 
would be difficult to dispute the proposition that an auction of assets would 
have been a more appropriate mechanism, However, once other considerations 
become relevant, the design of an auction becomes more complex. Essentially, 
an auction represents the interests of only the owners of the enterprise (namely 
the state), not other stakeholders, such as employees and local communities. 
One possibility would have been to have invited tenders to bid for enterprises 
that had employment subsidies attached; such a procedure could have internal- 
ized the social value attributed to increased employment. There are two prob- 
lems associated with employment subsidies. First, the development of indus- 
tries in particular areas of East Germany is part of a broader industrial policy. 
There are externalities  across firms in their decisions to locate in particular 
areas: the willingness of one firm to locate is dependent on the decision of 
others.  The internalization  of  such networking  considerations  is not  easily 
achieved through either simultaneous or sequential auctions. 
Second, employment  decisions can be reversed at low cost to employers 
but potentially at high cost to employees, local communities, and dependent 
suppliers and purchasers.  Thus, although the state could have provided em- 
ployment  subsidies in the form of  an ongoing subsidy that changed in line 
with employment rather than in the form of a discount on the initial purchase 
price, the costs to other stakeholders could not have been avoided. The Treu- 
handanstalt  has clearly placed considerable emphasis on the quality of  jobs, 
that is, on how secure they are as well as on how many are saved. Penalties 
could have been attached to shedding labor, but that would have introduced a 
third consideration  into the auction process alongside price and employment 
subsidy, namely, the creditworthiness of purchasers. Penalties are of little value 
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be particularly  acute for foreign  firms whose assets cannot be seized in the 
event of default on employment obligations. 
As a consequence, the THA has sought combinations of employment and 
investment guarantees from prospective  purchasers.  On the assumption  that 
there are sunk costs associated with capital expenditures and that there is com- 
plementarity between investment and employment, investment guarantees in- 
troduce an element of irreversibility into employment decisions that employ- 
ment  subsidies  on their  own  cannot achieve. For example,  suppose that an 
investment subsidy of DM 50 million is paid on an expenditure of DM 100 
million and that this is just sufficient to ensure a zero net present value on a 
private valuation. If, at the end of the five-year contractual period, the present 
value of the asset is DM 25 million, then the investment will be retained, pro- 
vided that the realizable  value of  the asset has fallen more than 75 percent 
below its purchase price. 
One example of where the THA has applied this principle is in relation to 
microelectronics. The THA has had interest in one particular site from a Far 
Eastern manufacturer that wishes to build a new microelectronics factory with 
a capital expenditure of DM 300 million and another buyer who is interested 
in the site as a depot for storage and the loading and unloading of lorries. The 
THA is inclined toward the first offer because of the greater commitment that 
the capital expenditure demonstrates. Likewise, bidders are more likely to be 
successful where they promise to build new factories rather than renovate old 
ones because of  the greater sunk investments associated with the former. 
As  in the case of employment subsidies with penalties for labor shedding, 
sales that are conditional on investment requirements involve credit evaluations 
of the ability of the purchaser to sustain the operation of its investments. The 
THA therefore looks carefully at the nature of potential purchasers. One ex- 
ample of where the credit evaluation failed was in the microelectronics indus- 
try. A West German firm established a GmbH with DM 100,000  to purchase a 
THA firm and then threatened to put the GmbH into bankruptcy if the contract 
was not altered to its advantage. 
Several of the functions of the Treuhandanstalt can be seen as a response to 
the above problems with auctions: the evaluation of the viability of  different 
parts of an enterprise; the assessment of the social as well as private value of 
the maintenance of operations; the stipulation of investment and employment 
requirements; and the careful analysis of prospective purchasers (table 14.7). 
However, there is one aspect of the operation of the Treuhandanstalt that the 
above does not capture, and that is the emphasis that has been placed on the 
creation of supervisory boards. To date, their function has essentially been lim- 
ited to managing  the transition  process.  Members of  the supervisory  board 
monitor and evaluate the incumbent management; they advise in the formula- 
tion of restructuring plans; they assist East German firms in establishing con- 
tacts with  Western  firms and finding outlets for their products  in the West; 
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Table 14.7  Market Alternatives to the Treuhandanstalt 
Market Process  Problems 
Simple auction 
Auction with employment subsidy 
Does not allow for social/private divergence in values of 
Reversibility  of employment decisions. Credit evaluations 
employment and industrial/regional policy 
required to enforce penalties. Does not internalize 
cross-firm externalities arising from regional and 
industrial effects 
Auction with investment and 
employment requirements  Credit evaluation of prospective purchasers is necessary 
functions are, to date they have been transitional  in nature. Once a company 
has been successfully sold in whole or in part, then the supervisory board and 
the holding company are frequently disbanded, as the Gisag case illustrates. 
Over the last year, a more permanent role for the creation  of  supervisory 
boards has emerged. To date, banks have provided little finance to East German 
enterprises that has not  been  guaranteed  by  the Treuhandanstalt.  There has 
been  some risky  lending associated with small-scale MBOs. Recently, West 
German banks have shown increased interest in providing both risky debt and 
some equity capital (see Carlin and Mayer 1992, 340-41).  The significance of 
this  is that,  once East German companies  are able to raise  finance without 
selling all their equity to Western firms, then the creation of  enterprises that 
are owned and controlled by East Germans becomes feasible. Of course, this 
has already occurred with small-scale privatizations; however, large-scale pri- 
vatizations  have to date usually  involved  wholesale  purchases  by  Western 
firms. 
Credit constraints are the main reason why sales to Western firms are almost 
unavoidable in the initial stages of privatization. However, it would be wrong 
to conclude that the availability of finance is the constraint on the development 
of East German enterprises. The reason why interest is now being shown by 
West German banks in lending to East German firms is that viable companies 
are beginning to emerge. The monitoring and control functions of supervisory 
boards have been central to this development. Through their position on super- 
visory boards, banks accumulate valuable information on the quality of pro- 
spective borrowers.  Banks are therefore just at the point of  being confident 
that they can identify sound investments. When this happens, the role of  the 
supervisory board will extend crucially beyond mere assistance with the transi- 
tion process to the creation of self-sufficient enterprises. An early statement of 
the guidelines for the privatization policy of the THA states that, in assessing 
offers, the continuation of the business if possible as an independent enterprise 
unit should be taken into account (THA 1990,3).  As the next section explains, 
this self-sufficiency may be of even greater significance to the rest of Eastern 
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14.4  The Relevance of the Treuhandanstalt Experience to the Rest of 
Eastern Europe 
There are several important respects in which the privatization problem in 
East Germany differs from that in the rest of Eastern Europe. On the negative 
side from the German perspective, economic and monetary  union has made 
much of the East German enterprise sector uncompetitive. For many firms, the 
costs of restructuring to achieve commercial viability in the unified German 
economy exceed the expected present value of the restructured firm (to a pri- 
vate owner). On the positive side, East Germany has access to all the resources 
associated with one of  the most highly developed economies in the world. 
These resources include transfers from the federal government,' institutional 
structures, legal systems, accounting and bankruptcy laws, training and appren- 
ticeship schemes, management, and finance. The East German experience may 
therefore  be  felt  to be  of  only  limited  significance  for  the  rest  of  Eastern 
Europe. 
While not denying the existence of these differences, many of the problems 
that the THA has been attempting to tackle are probably of even greater sig- 
nificance  in the rest  of Eastern Europe than  they are in Germany. The two 
that will be discussed here are industrial policy and ownership and control of 
enterprises. Much of the activity of the Treuhand can be viewed as an attempt 
to reconcile the interests of individual firms with those of regions and indus- 
tries as a whole.  In particular,  the emphasis on investment and employment 
conditionality was viewed as a response to problems of reversibility of corpo- 
rate policies that act against the local or industrial interest. That concern be- 
comes more relevant when one is talking about whole nations rather than re- 
gions of an economy. 
While investment requirements can be used as a method of committing pur- 
chasers to take account of broader interests in relation to assets under negotia- 
tion, it cannot bind purchasers to the longer-term  interests of  localities in re- 
lation to investments that have not yet even been contemplated. In other words, 
there is no system of investment and employment requirements that can effec- 
tively ensure congruence of interest of firms and nations in long-term corporate 
strategy. That is why nationality of ownership matters. What the German sys- 
tem of corporate ownership and control largely through the supervisory board 
has been very successful in doing is internalizing the externalities that exist 
across firms within a nation. 
The implication of this is that, in the long term, an important function of the 
Treuhandanstalt  has been to integrate East Germany into the German pattern 
of ownership and control. Control is gradually being devolved from the Treu- 
handanstalt via supervisory boards to German industry and banks. In contrast, 
1. For an assessment of the cost of the Treuhand, see DIW Wochenbericht, no. 7 (1992): 63-68; 
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auctions merely transfer ownership to those who have the best access to finan- 
cial resources. In the case of Eastern Europe, that means Western firms: credit 
constraints  on  East  European investors  prevent control from being  retained 
domestically. The solution is not simply to provide finance; what is required is 
the development  of  self-sufficient  organizations.  Once credible  enterprises 
have been created, then finance will flow naturally.  What is lacking are the 
mechanisms by which autonomous enterprises can be created. 
One of the lessons to be learned from the Treuhandanstalt experience is that 
the establishment of control structures does not require preexisting managerial 
resources. As the previous sections have mentioned, East Germany has often 
simply purchased managerial and supervisory services from mainly West Ger- 
man firms. They could equally well have come from any country. The social 
obligation felt by West German managers and banks may have allowed East 
German firms to purchase their services at below-market rates, but that is all. 
The purchase of foreign services does not involve the loss of  ownership and 
control because there is no investment; finance is only raised once the neces- 
sary management skills have been acquired, and then funds can be purchased 
in the form of debt rather than equity with no effect on ownership and control. 
The central  objection  to market  sales therefore  is that they  fail to  create 
appropriate control structures before finance is raised. The lesson that the Treu- 
handanstalt can provide is how these control structures can be established with- 
out allowing the abuses of state control to persist. 
14.5  Conclusions 
To  date, the Treuhand has secured employment guarantees for 1 million of 
the initial 4 million employees in THA firms. The criteria by which this perfor- 
mance should be judged are unclear, and it is not the purpose of this paper to 
evaluate the success of the Treuhand. Instead, the paper has the more limited 
aim of examining how the THA has sought to sell firms subject to employment, 
regional, and industrial policy constraints imposed by the government. Auc- 
tions, be they simple auctions, auctions with employment  subsidies, or auc- 
tions with investment and employment conditions attached, cannot readily at- 
tain  those  objectives.  Instead,  the  functions  of  the  Treuhandanstalt  can  be 
understood as a response to the problems associated with auctions. 
Six central functions of the Treuhand have been identified. It establishes the 
social value of firms; it disposes of uneconomic activities; it creates supervi- 
sory boards; it finds prospective buyers; it evaluates them; and it imposes in- 
vestment and employment conditions. 
These functions lend the Treuhandanstalt an important role in managing the 
transition process. In the last part of the paper, a longer-term effect of the East 
German approach was suggested. The creation of supervisory boards and the 
training of East German managers  are gradually permitting the evolution of 
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control over operations.  In the longer term, the Treuhandanstalt is therefore 
devolving control  not only to Western  enterprises  but  also to East  German 
firms themselves. 
The transition issues and the reconciliation of social objectives of  employ- 
ment and regional policy are as relevant to Eastern Europe as they are to East 
Germany.  The longer-term  issue  of  ownership  and control  is probably  of 
greater relevance to the rest  of Eastern Europe: in the German case, control 
remains within Germany; in other countries, control may not be retained do- 
mestically. The approach of the Treuhandanstalt suggests that effective corpo- 
rate control structures can be created without adequate managerial resources 
being available domestically. 
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Comment  Wilhelm Nolling 
The very interesting paper presented by  Wendy Carlin and Colin Mayer has 
two objectives. On the basis of a case study, they paint a clear picture of the 
complex tasks facing the Treuhandanstalt, which started with over 4 million 
employees and was thus the largest holding ever to exist. Carlin and Mayer 
then discuss the important question of the significance of this “German model” 
for the other countries of Eastern Europe. 
The key role of the Treuhandanstalt was and is to cushion the destructive 
effects of the 300 percent or more appreciation  and total exposure to world- 
wide competition. Its activities are greatly influenced by the following factors: 
(a)  the millions of property restitution claims lodged by West German citizens; 
(6) the strong investment incentives that are being financed directly out of pub- 
lic funds from West Germany and the EC; (c) the terrible environmental pollu- 
tion  caused by  East  German  industry;  (d)  the fact that  wages  increased  so 
rapidly; (e)  the continued movement of skilled labor to the West; and (f) the 
lack of accountable ownership, which means that there is no effective control 
of the use of public funds. 
At present, the functions of the Treuhandanstalt are as follows: monitoring 
whether the conditions imposed on enterprises that have already been privat- 
ized (e.g., employment and investment obligations) have been fulfilled; closing 
enterprises that cannot be restructured; and privatizing as well as maintaining 
and restructuring,  the remaining  portfolio  of  Treuhandanstalt  enterprises.  A 
new approach, however, is being contemplated, consisting of three additional 
methods: (1) allowing bids for whole sectors, such as furniture; (2) involving 
investment firms, banks,  and insurance companies (privatization would then 
rest with them); (3) founding so-called  Managementgesellschaften, in which 
the THA would have only a minority interest (it would be their job to privatize 
or to consolidate certain parts of the Treuhand portfolio). 
Carlin  and Mayer mentioned  three alternatives to THA policy. These are 
straightforward auctions, auctions with the provision of employment subsidies, 
and auctions with provisions for investment and employment guarantees. Fi- 
nally, they argue that current THA practice is superior to these alternatives. 
Auction and participation models have so far not been put into practice, first, 
because these models were proposed too late in the day and, second, because 
there were hardly any East German enterprises that offered credible profitabil- 
ity prospects. In addition, the participation model has intrinsic technical diffi- 
culties such as time-consuming valuation procedures, denomination of shares, 
the question of to whom to distribute shares (the issue of social justice), and 
the guaranteeing of dividends. There is a real danger that such securities would 
prove worthless and that the whole idea of participation  would  be regarded 
as fraudulent. 
Guided by  experience, theoretical considerations,  and an awareness of the 
vast scope and time scale required in order to approach privatization, the Treu- 209  The Treuhandanstalt: Privatization by State and Market 
handanstalt adopted the only rational and economically feasible approach left 
open. Nonetheless, the task of adjusting policies in the second half of  1991 
proved quite difficult. (1) It came as a surprise to many of us when the Treuhan- 
danstalt conceded that it no longer aims to privatize all enterprises in full but 
is willing to retain minority ownership. In a large number of cases, it has in- 
deed retained  a minority  stake-something  that it had previously  refused to 
do. (2) The THA greatly intensified its efforts to sell to foreign investors and 
regionalized its operations. (3) Reluctantly, the Treuhandanstalt agreed to par- 
ticipate  in  special job-creation  schemes  and  training  organizations  created 
within the enterprises it administers. Carlin and Mayer fail to examine this 
aspect, even though it has major implications for the labor market as well as 
for overall policy (i.e., with regard to the postponement of closures). 
In their paper, Carlin and Mayer focus primarily on the role of  the Treu- 
handanstalt in reconstruction. This could lead to the false impression that the 
Treuhandanstalt generally accords greater priority to reconstruction than to pri- 
vatization.  The Unification  Agreement  commissions  the Treuhandanstalt  to 
“restructure along competitive lines and privatize the former state-owned en- 
terprises.” This, however, does not imply any preordained sequence on the part 
of the government. The Treuhandanstalt has consistently given priority to pri- 
vatization. It has not tired of emphasizing this fact and has acted accordingly. 
If the Treuhandanstalt were to devote major efforts to restructuring, it could 
easily become a lasting repository for inefficient enterprises-and  a bottom- 
less pit for state subsidies. Even under the present policy, the Treuhandanstalt 
has no choice but to incur gigantic debts that will prevent the stabilization of 
government finances for years to come. 
In view of the large number of enterprises still awaiting privatization in East 
Germany, there is no alternative but to privatize as much as possible as quickly 
as possible, A factor that  is often overlooked  is that the Treuhandanstalt  is 
not in a position to evaluate, monitor,  and revise  vast numbers of business 
development plans. 
Is “retention of domestic control” an important criterion? In my view, this 
approach has numerous pitfalls: (i) Enterprises that can be rescued (including 
those currently making losses) should be transferred immediately to private 
ownership. Investors whose capital is at risk will take a more realistic view of 
the necessary restructuring tasks. Investors who reach the wrong conclusions 
lose their own money. The deferment of privatization merely places an added 
burden on state finances and slows down the restructuring process. (ii) In view 
of  the four decades during which East Germany had no real experience of 
private ownership of the means of production, there are only three economi- 
cally viable options for achieving effective local ownership and control: man- 
agement buyouts;  the  subsequent  sale of  residual  stakes held  by  the Treu- 
handanstalt to the local population; and the restitution of  business enterprises 
to their former owners. (iii) The emergence of  large numbers of  new small- 
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units-will  help  strengthen  the  local  industrial  base  in  the  former  East 
Germany. 
What are the prospects?  (I) As referred  to earlier,  privatization  has pro- 
ceeded at a fairly rapid pace in certain branches. (2) An increasing number of 
companies whose products are no longer in demand in East Germany andlor 
whose markets disappeared with the collapse of the CMEA (Council for Mu- 
tual Economic Assistance) are being closed down. (3) Some 5,700 companies 
are still waiting for action to be taken and are uncertain about whether they 
face closure. This year, the Treuhandanstalt intends to keep up the rapid pace 
of privatization achieved in 1991. However, this will prove an even more diffi- 
cult task as it is reasonable to assume that the companies with the best business 
prospects have already been privatiLed. (4) The Treuhandanstalt will continue 
to hold companies that are in the red within certain branches or regions, either 
because there is reason to be optimistic about the prospects of reorganization 
or because current employment or regional policies weigh against closure. In 
such cases, huge subsidies are required in order to fund technological modern- 
ization  and/or  update  training  and  management  as  well  as  to  reorganize 
auditing and to cover losses. 
On the basis of these perspectives, it appears that, on the one hand, the tasks 
of the Treuhandanstalt have become more difficult and complex while, on the 
other, its work in particular regions or branches could soon be completed-or 
indeed has already been completed. 
Privatization in Eastern Europe and the Lessons of Privatization in 
East Germany 
Privatization does not seem to have made major progress in Eastern Europe. 
In these countries, we are still witnessing the very earliest stages of privatiza- 
tion.  By  contrast  with  East  Germany, the  economies of  the East  European 
countries are not in such a desolate condition or state of collapse because they 
are not subject to the fatal overnight exposure to worldwide competition. This 
leads me to conclude that the governments in these countries have more time 
to enact privatization  policies than was available in East Germany. However, 
the uniqueness of the East German economic reforms lies in the existence of  a 
common language, a common heritage, and the maintenance of many family 
ties as well as the massive  transfer of  management  skills in the private and 
public  sectors. These are all important advantages that do not pertain  else- 
where. 
What recommendations  can  be made on  the basis  of the German experi- 
ence? (1) The motto must be, Privatize at virtually any cost. In other words, 
privatize as much as possible and as quickly as possible. With regard to enter- 
prises that are not yet privatized and that are deemed to have potential,  the 
same policy should be pursued as in East Germany. (2) As in East Germany, 
the necessary conditions for privatization  must be created and made viable in 
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clear legislation on property rights and the creation of free-market controls and 
institutions as well as the removal of investment and wage structure disincen- 
tives.  Large  state-owned  enterprises  must  be  divided  up  and  reorganized. 
(3) As far as lessons for East Europe’s privatization are concerned, I would like 
to emphasize the following. We  are all well aware that these countries need 
wider access to Western markets as well as massive debt relief. Unless these 
absolutely necessary conditions are fulfilled, it is difficult to conceive that new, 
stable, market-oriented, capitalist economies will become established in our 
lifetime. 
Discussion Summary 
Colin Mayer agreed with Wilhelm Nolling’s suggestion that companies should 
be moved out of Treuhand control as fast as possible. Mayer emphasized that 
the Treuhand has pursued this goal while simultaneously trying to minimize 
the associated social cost of the economic restructuring. 
Jan Winiecki criticized the recommendations for the rest of Eastern Europe 
that the authors had drawn on the basis of the Treuhand experience. He said 
that the Treuhand’s supervisory boards  had been so successful because they 
were populated with West German managers. Such highly skilled supervisory 
boards could not be replicated in countries like Poland. Winiecki concluded 
by  proposing several lessons that the authors had not noted. He said that the 
Treuhand had demonstrated the advantage of  splitting companies and finan- 
cially restructuring them before privatization. 
Andrew Berg and Stanley Fischer also suggested that many of the Treuhand’s 
most successful features would be difficult to replicate in the rest of  Eastern 
Europe. Berg emphasized that the Treuhand has the benefit of having relatively 
easy access to West German financial capital. Fischer stressed the Treuhand’s 
access to West German financial and managerial expertise. 
In response to the warnings about the difficulty of replicating the Treuhand’s 
success in other East European countries, Mayer said that these countries could 
hire the necessary trained personnel from the West. Moreover, he noted, this 
hiring would be limited to the extent that such personnel would be needed only 
for some of the positions on supervisory boards, not for day-to-day manage- 
ment of the companies in question. He emphasized that only 10 percent of the 
managers of East German firms have been brought in from West Germany and 
that, to date, almost all the MBOs (management buyouts)  have been imple- 
mented by East German managers. 
Andrus Simon noted  that the principles of  the Hungarian  State Property 
Agency are similar to those of  the Treuhand. In particular, both bodies have 
been given the tasks of opening up balance sheets, commercializing compa- 
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ever, he noted that there are also contrasts between the German and the Hun- 
garian approaches. In Hungary, there is less emphasis on implicit employment 
subsidies because the relatively low real wage suggests that the unemployment 
problem will be less severe. In addition, the Hungarians have not implemented 
a policy of debt cancellations. 
Simon identified two fundamental problems in  Hungary  that suggest that 
the privatization process in Hungary will evolve more slowly than that in East 
Germany. First, Hungary faces logistical constraints because it does not have 
access to resources like those in Germany (e.g., trained personnel and a work- 
ing body of commercial laws). He estimated that, on their own, these logistical 
constraints put  Hungary  two  or three years  behind  East Germany. Second, 
Hungary lacks a social structure that could support a capitalist economy. Hun- 
gary has neither savers nor entrepreneurs. He said that Hungary needs a class 
of risk takers who are willing to manage firms in which they have a personal 
stake. He estimated that creating a “capitalist society” will take five to fifteen 
years. 
Jeffrey Sachs suggested that the record of  the Treuhand did not bode well 
for other East  European  countries  like Poland.  He noted  that East  German 
restructuring  has  taken  place  in  the  best  possible  circumstances:  the  Ger- 
man government is relatively strong and immune from local politics, and Ger- 
many has a very successful monetary  policy with a completely independent 
central  bank. Even with these advantages, Sachs noted, the restructuring  of 
East Germany has been accompanied by substantial rent seeking, exemplified 
by state subsidies that have been channeled through institutions like the Treu- 
hand to support and validate rapid East-West wage equalization. Sachs noted 
that this outcome may be satisfactory in Germany, where it is possible each 
year to transfer 75 percent  of  East  German GNP from West Germany. But 
this option is not available to other East European countries, which have weak 
governments  that face enormous demands on very limited resources. Sachs 
concluded that the Treuhand structure did not adequately immunize the state 
from political pressure. 
Rudiger Dornbusch responded to Sachs by  noting that the policy of wage 
equalization was actually a deliberate social strategy and hence did not reflect 
badly on the restructuring process. Janet Yellen offered a different twist on this 
argument. She suggested that one of the interesting attributes of the Treuhand 
is that the agency has enabled the German government to mask the scope of 
the massive transfers that are taking place. Yellen said much of the Treuhand’s 
costs arise off budget, like allowing newly privatized firms to sell off land. She 
believes that the German public would resist transparent expenditures as large 
as the hidden costs that the Treuhand is accepting. Dornbusch also suggested 
an  unusual  strength of  the Treuhand. Because the  agency uses a variety of 
mechanisms, it cannot be accused of choosing exactly the wrong one. He noted 
that, elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the debate over which mechanism is pre- 
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Philippe Aghion  suggested  that it may be optimal to have more than one 
privatization  agency. Increasing the number of  agencies decreases the likeli- 
hood of regulatory capture. However, with too many agencies, economies of 
scale are lost. Aghion conjectured that  there may be an optimal  number of 
agencies that balances these two effects. 
Jacek Rostowski said that Mayer’s conclusion that the Treuhand has pursued 
a strategy that minimizes the social cost of restructuring  was a “Panglossian 
ex post rationalization.”  Rostowski suggested that the Treuhand has been suc- 
cessful because it has taken the easy path of distributing the gains from priva- 
tization unevenly. 
Mayer concluded the discussion by arguing that pragmatic institutions like 
the Treuhand may end up performing better than hypothetically optimal insti- 
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